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ACRONYMS
DWV ........ dielectric withstanding voltage
FJPS ........ field joint protection system
GEI ......... ground environment instrumentation
IFA ......... in-flight anomaly
IPR ......... interim problem report
JPS ......... joint protection system
KSC ......... Kennedy Space Center
LCC ......... launch commit criteria
LH .......... left hand
mA .......... milliampere
NSTS ........ National Space Transportation System
OMI ......... Operations Maintenance Instructions
OMRSD ...... Operations and Maintenance Requirements and Specification
Document
postflight engineering evaluation limits
Postflight Engineering Evaluation Plan
PEEL ........
PEEP ........
PR ..........
RH ..........
RSRM ........
SIT .........
SRB .........
SSME ........
STS .........
TPS .........
problem report
right hand
redesigned solid rocket motor
systems integration test
solid rocket booster
space shuttle main engine
space transportation system
thermal protection system
V ........... volt
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INTRODUCTION
Two redesigned solid rocket motors (RSRM), designated 360L006A and 360L006B, as
part of NASA Space Shuttle Mission STS-34, were launched from Kennedy Space
Center (KSC) on 18 October 1989. The three field joints on each motor, a total of
six field joints, were protected by the field joint protection system (FJPS) shown in
Figure 1. The FJPS is used to keep the field joint O-rings above the minimum
launch commit criteria (LCC) temperature during the launch countdown, to keep
rainwater from entering the field joint, and to protect the joint components from
aerodynamic heating during flight. The igniter-to-case joint on each RSRM was
fitted with an igniter heater to keep the igniter seals above minimum LCC
temperature requirements during launch countdown (Figure 2).
The ground environment instrumentation (GEI) and heater power cables are
protected by the thermal protection system (TPS). The purpose of the TPS is to
protect the GEI and heater systems from aeroheating during flight.
After booster separation and splash down, the boosters were recovered and
towed to KSC Hangar AF for postflight inspection and disassembly. The FJPS, TPS,
systems tunnel, and igniter heater installation inspections were performed per
Postflight Engineering and Evaluation Plan (PEEP) TWR-50050, Vol I (Reference 1).
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OBJECTIVE
The objectiveof this report is to document any heater anomalies during the launch
countdown and any anomalies to the FJPS, TPS, or systems tunnel components
during flightand recovery operations. This report willalso address all"squawks" or
problem reports (PR) initiatedduring postflightevaluation.
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SUMMARY
Postflight assessment results indicate that all TPS and systems tunnel components
were in excellent condition, as compared to previous flights, with typical flight heat
effects and erosion. No squawks or PRs were written against the TPS or systems
tunnel. There were a total of sixteen aft edge hits, eight on each motor; the largest
missing piece of TPS cork measured 4 by 1.5 by 0.25 inch. Each hit left a clean
substrate, indicating that the damage was caused by nozzle severance debris/water
impact. No postflight engineering evaluation limits (PEEL) requirements or NSTS
debris criteria for missing TPS were violated.
One unbond measuring 5.0 in. circumferentially by 1.0 in. axially was found on
the left hand (LH) center field joint K5NA closeout. The observation was elevated
to an in-flight anomaly (IFA), STS-34-M-4, by the NASA Ice/Debris team. This
condition was caused by impact damage to the case, as evidenced by a black streak
the same width as the unbound and deformation of the K5NA aft edge. It was
determined that the unbond occurred after booster separation and no corrective
action was taken.
The RH center field joint heater failed the dielectric withstanding voltage
(DWV) test after joint closeout. The heater was then disabled by opening the circuit
breaker, and the redundant heater was used. Postflight evaluation of the primary
heater discovered a 2,900-ohm short between the primary heater and the heater
shield. The redundant heater performed nominally during the launch countdown.
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CONCLUSIONS/RECOMMENDATIONS
The JPS heaters performed as expected and maintained the field joint temperatures
within the LCC required range during hunch countdown. Postflight inspection
verified that the TPS, FJPS, and systems tunnel all performed as designed with
typical flight heat effects and erosion. The anomaly observed on the FJPS occurred
after booster separation and had no impact on flight safety or schedule
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DISCUSSION
5.1 PREFLIGHT HEATER CONTROL SYSTEM AND PERFORMANCE
The field joint heaters and igniter-to-case joint heaters performed nominally during
the launch countdown. No LCC thermal violations occurred during the LCC
timeframe.
The igniter heaters were activated between L-24 hours and L-4 hours and
50 minutes and maintained the joints within the LCC temperature limits of 66 ° to
123°F. The heaters were deactivated approximately 50 minutes earlier than
specified in the Operations and Maintenance Requirements and Specification
Document (OMRSD). The early deactivation resulted in an interim problem report
(IPR), which was dispositioned by a waiver of the OMRSD. Because of the short
launch window, an effort was made to perform launch sequence steps at the earliest
time allowed by the Operations Maintenance Instructions (OMI). Although the
appropriate OMRSD requirements are referenced in the OMI steps, no actual
mention is made of the requirement that igniter heater deactivation is not to be
performed prior to L-4 hours. Therefore, igniter heater power removal was
performed at the earliest possible moment: L-4 hours and 50 minutes. The result
of the early deactivation was negligible due to the warm ambient temperatures prior
to launch.
The field joint heaters were activated between L-11 hours, 11 minutes and L-1
minute and maintained the joints within the LCC temperature limits of 85 ° to
122°F. Of the 24 sensors, 23 recorded temperatures in the expected range. The
LH center field joint temperature sensor located at 195 deg showed an inaccurate
reading. The sensor was severed prior to the systems integration test (SIT), and was
deleted from the control logic of the field joint heater. The loss of the single sensor
did not violate the LCC requirement that two of the four sensors per heater be
operational, and heater control was not affected.
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The RH center field joint heater failed the DWV test after installation and joint
cioseout. The test requires that the heater and cabling exhibit no more than 1 mA
current leakage when a 1,500 V electrical potential is applied element-to-element
and element-to-shield. The RH center field joint primary heater failed the 1 mA
requirement when only 100 V was applied. Due to the severity of the failure, the
heater was disabled by opening the circuit breaker and the redundant heater was
activated. The redundant heater passed the DWV test and performed nominally
during the launch countdown. Postflight evaluation of the primary heater revealed a
2,900-ohm short between the primary heater and the heater shield. The exact cause
of failure was not positively identified; however, microscopic examination of the
heater revealed a metallic sliver in the heater shield which could have contributed
to the failure. A similar failure of a secondary field joint heater on Flight 4 was
attributed to a short between the heater power cable and the connector shell.
5.2 POSTFLIGHT INSPECTION OF FJPS, TPS, SYSTEMS TUNNEL,
AND IGNITER HEATER INSTALLATION
The condition of both motors was similar to previous flight motors; most of the heat
effects occurred on the inboard side of the aft segments. These areas experience
high aerodynamic heating normal to protuberance components. They also receive
the high plume radiation and base recirculation heating induced by the adjacent
solid rocket boosters (SRB) and space shuttle main engine (SSME) on the aft-facing
surfaces. There was slight charring of the TPS over the GEI cabling runs in this
area, typical of previous flights.
5.2.1 Field Joint Protection System
The FJPS was in good condition overall. There were no signs of ablation on any of
the joint protection systems (JPS), and only slight paint blistering on the cork cover.
The paint on the K5NA closeout aft of the cork was also slightly darkened and
blistered, with occasional pitting. This condition was typical of previous flights and
was probably due to aerodynamic heating and the result of nozzle severance debris
and water impact.
One unbond, measuring 5.0 in. circumferentially by 1.0 in. axially, was noted at
the 0-deg location on the LH center field joint K5NA closeout. The observation was
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elevated to an IFA (STS-34-M-4) by the NASA Ice/Debris team (Appendix A). The
K5NA was unbonded from both the motor case wall and the JPS cork but remained
in place. Impact damage to the case was evidenced by a black streak the same
width as the unbound. The aft edge of the K5NA closeout was deformed at the
unbond location, but there was no soot underneath. Both the unbond and the
streak were attributed to either burning debris from the nozzle severance system or
water impact. Minor divots caused by debris have been seen on previous flights, but
this is the first occurrence of a K5NA unbond. Since the unbond occurred after
booster separation, there is no impact relative to flight safety for future missions.
5.2.2 Thermal Protection _y_t_m
TPS performance was excellent during flight operation, with typical heat effects and
no ablation. There were no IFAs, squawks, or PRs written against the TPS.
There were a total of sixteen aft edge hits, eight on each motor. Of the TPS
cork pieces that were missing, each left a clean substrate, which indicates that the
hits were caused by nozzle severance debris/water impact. Six of these cork pieces
exceeded 0.07 in. 3, but none violated NSTS debris criteria for missing TPS since
they were not lost during ascent. The largest GEI cork piece" missing was
approximately 4.0 by 1.5 by 0.25 inch, or 1.5 in.a. This piece was located at Station
1410 on the LH aft center segment at approximately 270 deg. It was either a
handling or a splashdown scrape and left a clean substrate.
5.2.3 Systems Tunnel
The cork TPS adjacent to the systems tunnel floor plate was in excellent condition.
There was very little paint blistering, and all K5NA closeouts over cables and tunnel
seams were in excellent condition. No IFAs, squawks, or PRs were written against
the systems tunnel.
5.2.4 I_iter Heater and Forward Dome Power Cable Installation
Postflight inspection of the igniter heater installation and power cables revealed no
anomalies. The igniter heater, cork, and band clamp were removed and inspected at
Hangar AF with no anomalies noted.
m
w
.EV,S,ON__ OOCNO TWR-17545 [ VOL IV
91211-1.12 SEC [ PAGE 9
T_-_'_ CORPORATION
SPACE OPERATIONS
APPENDIX A
LH Center Field Joint Anomaly Documentation
m
z
Postfire Observation Report No. 360L006A-13
In-Flight Anomaly Report No. STS-34-M-4
Postfire Anomaly Report No. 360L006A-13
Program Requirements Control Board Directive No. $44804J
24-Hour Report DR 4-5/179
Memo: Closure of Significant Problem Report DR 4-5/179
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POSTFIRE OBSERVATION RECORD (PFOR) A-4
Field Joint External Insulation Conaltlon
Mo,or.o.: _"' _' ' i S_de: [] Le,t IA) [] R,ghtCa) i Date:
In_Dector(s): "',,,I) L'¢.,.. /._ ,.Is _._;, (_s_.. r£.
10 . Z._- ;"
Joint: [] Forward Skirt (FSK) [] Forwerd (FWD) (__!]'Center (CTR)
Field Joint External Insulation ObservaUons:
A. Charred/Heat Affected Materiel (HTAFF)?
B. Misting TPS Material > 0.7 cu. In. Due To
Ascent/Motor Operation (TPSVD)?
C. Mieelng TPS Matertel > 0.7 cu. In. Due To
Reentry/Debris/Water Impact (TPSDM)?
D. Unbond|l/Crncke (DEBND)?
E. Evidence of Water Leakage From Field
Joint (WATER)?
F. Misslng/Unbonded Vent Valves (MISSG)?
(FWD, CTR, end AFT Jotntt only.)
[] Aft (AFT) [] Aft Skirt (ASK)
Yes No Comment #
v
v/ I
II"
Record the following if any of the above condition= exist.'
Stsrtlng Ending Starting Ending Clrcum-
Condition Slatlon Station Degree Degree ferentlal Axial Radial
..... _(Observation Location Location _ Location Location. _ .-WJdt,h_- Length Depth
Code) (in.) (In.) (deg.) (de=.) (In.) (In.) (In.)
Volumt
(in.3)
Notes I Commente
,, .,.
_ Clarification cheer(l) etteched? _ no
¢
yell (Provide clsrlflcsUon number(t).)
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POSTFIRE ANOMALY RECORD (PFAR)
..... . ....... .... ......... . ...... . ................. .................. ............. .---.-..-.-.............................
1. PFAR NUMBER 3. INSPECTION LOCATION 4. REFERENCE SOUAWK NUMBER J 5. REFERENCE PR NUMBER
360LOO6A-13 KSC X T-24/T-9Z N/A I N/A
..................................... t .... . ........................ _ .--..... ....... .°...°......
2. SRM MOTOR NUHBER H-7 A-2 6. REFERENCE |FA NUMBER ] 7. REFERENCE $PR NUMBER
360LOO6A ...... STS-34-N-4 _ DR4-5/179
.................. . ............. . ............. emm.lt ........ ...... .............. ...........mDellt ...... ..lmlll6tlle...
8. TITLE
UNBOMDED K5NA IN LH CENTER FIELD JOINT JPS
........ ° ...... .°.... ..... .. .................. ..............-..----- ...... . .......... ..................................
9. CLASSIFICATION
OBSERVATION X MINOR ANOMALY MAJOR ANOMALY CRITICAL ANOMALY
... .-- ... ...
...... °° ...... . .......... ... ......................... ... ........... . .................. ..................................
N/A KSNA ABLATION COMPOUND STW5-3183
................................................................ .... ................. .....°.°......,e...................
13. REPORTED BY (NAME / ORGANIZATION / OBSERVATION DATE)
S. E. MANZ / THERMAL INSULATION DESIGN ENGINEERING / 10/21/89
...................... _ ................................ . ......................... . ............ .........................,
14. RESPONSIBLE COMPONENT TEAM / PROGRAM MANAGER
JPS / G, L, STEPHENS
...................... ° ................................ . ............................................... ..°-.....m.*,.*.°
15. RESPONSIBLE PROJECT ENGINEER (NAME / ORGANIZATION )
J. H. SELLER / SYSTEMS INTEGRATION AND ENGINEERING
........................................................................................................ • .......q.,o°...
16. RESPONSIBLE DESIGN ENGINEER (NAME / ORGANIZATION)
C. L. PROKOP / STAGE HARDWARE DESIGN
............................................................................................................... .--...-..
17. DESCRIPTION (ATTACH PFOR, FIGURES, PHOTOGRAPHS, ETC.)
KSNA on the aft edge of the center field joint JPS was unbonded but stilt in place at 0 degrees. The unbond
measured 5.0 inches cJrcumferentlalIy by 1.0 inches axially. Debris Impact was evidenced by a b(ack streak on the
case at the unbond location having the same width as the unbond. The unbonded KSNA was deformed but there was no
soot found underneath.
................................................................................................................... ...o-
18. JUSTIFICATION OF CLASSIFICATION (POSTFIRE ENGINEERING EVALUATION LIMITS)
Not a design issue, condition caused by debris impact during reentry.
19. CAUSE
Obvious debris Impact. Debris source could have been created at nozzle severance or water ln_pect.
20. RECOMMENDED CORRECTIVE ACTION 21. ANOMALY APPROVAL SIGNATURE
None. RPRB SECRETARY: DATE:
/S/S. T. MUNSON 11/16/89
22. OBSERVATION/ANOMALY APPROVAL SIGNATURES
PE: DATE:
/S/J. M. SELLER 11/16/89
PH: DATE :
/S/G. L. STEPHENS 11/21189
........
N/A ......
............................... . ...... ° .....
25. RPRB CLOSURE SIGNATURE
(REOUIRED ONLY IF BLOCK 24 CHECKED "YES")
RPRB SECRETARY: DATE:
NIA NIA
............................................
26. OBSERVAT I ON/ANOMALY CLOSURE S I GNATURE
PH: DATE:
/S/G. L. STEPHENS 11/21/89
........ ......... ........
11108189 I 11/02/89 ] ! 11121189
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TO:
CC:
FROM:
SUBJECT:
REFERENCE:
G. B. Thompson, Manager
RSRM System Safety
See distribution
D. J. Braithwaite - Ext. 6904
RSRM Liaison/Problem Reporting
24-Hour Report DR4L5/179, "Center Field Joint
Aft Edge K5NA Unb_O6 (STS-34A), LH
(A)"
IFA: STS-34-M-4
A K5NA unbond was found on the aft edge of the center field
joint of 360L006A.
This problem has been classified as an In-Flight Anomaly, and
is therefore reportable to NASA per DPD 400, Rev. C, DR4-5.
The subject 24-Hour report has been coordinated with the
cognizant Project Engineer and Program Manager, and will be
followed by 5-Day and 21-Day written reports and/or a closure
recommendation memo.
D. J. Braithwaite
Concurrence:
K. A. Dixon, _upervisor .'/'L_
RSRM Liaison/Problem Reporting
_. M_." eider, Systems Integration Project Engineer
G. L. Step_ens, Program Manager
_L _ .9c. -"- 9rJgn.7.,, _ C ,'. , " ,','-302-0707 ,$tl_ ' 963.35 ,' 1 A-_
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SIGNIFICANT PROBLEM REPORT DR4-5/179
24-HOUR REPORT
PROBLEM TITLE: Center Field Joint Aft Edge K5NA Unbond, 360L006
(STS-34A), LH (A)
Reference: In-Flight Anomaly STS-34-M-4
A. NATURE OF THE PROBLEM:
A K5NA unbond was noted on the aft edge of the 360LOO6A
center field joint. The unbond was located at the 0 degree
location and measured 5 inches circumferentially. The K5NA
was unbonded from both the case wall and JPS cork. The aft
edge of the K5NA was deformed, indicating some type of
impact.
B. IMPACT OR POTENTIAL IMPACT OF THE PROBLEM:
None. Minor impact damage to the K5NA caused by water or
debris impact is not uncommon. This condition has no effect
on flight safety or segment reusability.
C. DATE OF OCCURRENCE:
18 October 1989
(Identified as a PAS report 3 November 1989)
D LOCATION OF ARTICLE AT TIME OF OCCURRENCE:
Detected during postflight assessment, Hanger AF, Kennedy
Space Center.
E. TEST OR OPERATION BEING pERFORMED AT TIME OF OCCURRENCE:
Detected during postflight assessment at KSC.
F. CONDITIONS AT TIME OF OCCURRENCE:
Unknown.
G ARTICLE:
Stock Number: 5752
Part Name: Ablation compound, cork-filled (K5NA)
H. CONTRACTOR DELIVERABLE ITEM DESCRIPTION:
RSRM Case, 360LOO6A
u
A-7
a__
w
I. DESCRIPTION OF FAILURE INCLUDING COMPARISON OF EXPECTED EVENTS
WITH ACTUAL EVENTS :
A K5NA unbond was found on the aft edge of the center field
joint on 360LOO6A. The KSNA was unbonded from both the case
wall and cork. Minor divots caused by debris have been seen
on previous flights, but this is the first occurrence of a
K5NA unbond.
J. CRITICALITY WITH RELATIONSHIP TO MISSION EFFECTS:
Criticality 3.
K. CAUSE OF FAISURE:
A scrape was found just aft of the unbond area and in line
with the 0 degree location, indicating contact with some
object(s). The scrape was approximately the same width as
the unbond. Debris from the nozzle jettison or water impact
are considered to be the cause for both the scrape and
urlbond. Due to the geometry involved it is unlikely that
debris from the orbiter or external tank could have caused
the noted condition.
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Vice President, RSRM Program Management
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E600-FY90-362
George C. Marshall Space Flight Center
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Marshall Space Flight Center, AL 35812
Attention Mr. R. E. Mitchell, SA42
Gentlemen:
Subject: Closure of Significant Problem Report,
DR 4-5/179
Reference: Memo 8502:FYgO:M192/DJB, B. Thompson from
D. Braithwaite, DR 4-5/179, "Center Field Joint Aft
Edge K5NA Unbond, 360L006 (STS-34A), LH (A)", dated
03 November 1989
The information and rationale presented in the referenced memo are
provided to support closure of the subject problem.
If you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact
Brent Thompson at Thiokol on extension 3356.
Very truly yours,
I -,
._C. n. bpeak(
CAS: RMP/I h
Encl :
CC:
als
F. Brasfield TC/MSFC
B. Loden, CALSPAN
K. Henson, SA51
S. Coleman, SA52
F. Bingham, 851
T. Johnson, E62C
B. Papasian
K. Dixon, 851
E. Skrobiszewski, K68
R. Hurst, 851
T. Bassett, E60
B. Thompson
w
PO Box 707,Brigham City,UT 84302-0707 i80l_863-3243 A-9
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3 November 1989
8502:FY90:MI92/DJB
TO:
CC:
FROM:
SUBJECT:
REFERENCE:
G. B. Thompson, Manager
Systems Safety
R. R. Bowman, C. A. Speak, S. B. Kulkarni
D. E. Thompson, R. M. Rasmussen,
M. T. Allison, T. L. Johnson, J. H. Keller
D. J. Braithwaite, Ext. 6904
RSRM Liaison/Problem Reporting
Closure Recommendation for Significant Problem
Report DR4-5/179 "Center Eield Joint Aft Edge
KSNA Unbond, 360L006 (STS-34A), LH (A)"
In-Flight Anomaly No. STS-34-M-4
BACKGROU_
A K5NA unbond was noted on the aft edge of the 360LOO6A
center field joint. The unbond was located at the 0 degree
location and measured 5 inches circumferentially. The K5NA
was unbonded from both the case wall and JPS cork.
CAUSE OF PROBLEM
The aft edge of the K5NA was deformed indicating some type
of debris impact. A scrape was found just aft of the ul_ond
area and in line with the 0 degree location, indicating
contact w_th some object(s). The scrape was approximately
the same width as the unbond. Both the scrape and the K5NA
unbond are attributed to debris from the nozzle jettison or
water entry. Minor divots caused by debris have been seen
on previous flights. Due to the geometry involved it is
unlikely that debris from the external tank or orbiter could
have caused the noted condition.
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G. B. Thompson
3 November 1989
Page Two
CLOSURE RATIONAL
It is requested that the subject SPR be closed based on the
following:
O Deformation of the K5NA and the scrape on the case wall
indicate that the unbonds were caused by impact.
O Minor damage to the K5NA caused by debris or water
impact is not uncommon (reference - TWR 50050 "Postfire
Engineering Evaluation Plan").
O Unbonds such as this (occurring during reentry) have no
affect on flight safety or segment reusability.
If you have any questions about this issue please contact Dave
Braithwaite at the extension listed above.
D. J. Braithwaite
@ ( )_. J l' " ' "J-_'-"---
/ k , _ IK. . Dixon, Supervisor
RSRM Liaison/Problem Reporting
_'M. Seiler
Systems Integration Project Engineer
Program Manager
_M. A. Kahn, Director
VSafety, Reliability & Quality Assurance
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TVR-50050 VOL. I, Book I, Revision A,
Evaluation Plan (Internal and External
and T. Morgan, 21 November 1989.
'KSC Postfllght Engineering
Insulation)', L.E. MacCauley
TVR-17430, 'KSC Ten-Day Postflight Hardware Evaluation Report For
360L006 (RSRM-6, STS-34)', L.E. MacCauley, I0 November 1989.
TWR-17545 VOL. I, 'Flight Motor Set 360L006 (STS-34) Final Report',
D.M. Garecht, 27 april 1990.
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